My view
My main question is not simply whether oil prices will rise. It is how much oil can reach buyers, through which route, and at what extra cost. Saudi–Houthi fighting adds pressure to an already disrupted region. I would model both the price of oil and the amount that can actually be delivered.
What supports it
EIA estimates that crude production shut-ins averaged 6.7 million barrels a day in August, up from 5.0 million in July. The IEA reports that observed oil inventories fell by 507 million barrels from February through August. These are signs of a physical supply problem, not only fear about what might happen. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration International Energy Agency.
What is confirmed, and what is still a claim
Reuters reported on 24 September that Saudi Arabia said it intercepted Houthi missiles, while the Houthis claimed strikes on Saudi targets. The report also said pumping through the East-West pipeline was building again after a shutdown. Saudi Arabia blamed the earlier pipeline attack on Iraqi militia. I would not describe every attack as Houthi-caused, or treat claims of damage as confirmed losses. Source: Reuters, via Al-Monitor.
Why the route matters
The East-West pipeline and Yanbu offer a way around Hormuz. EIA says attacks affecting the Bab el-Mandeb route reduced Yanbu exports in August, and that sending cargo north through Suez adds time and cost for Asian buyers. My interpretation is that the value of an alternative route falls when both routes face problems. A pipeline restart helps, but it does not by itself prove that loading and delivery are back to normal. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
The wider effect
My reading is that the conflict connects local fighting in Yemen with the security of a major trade route. That gives other countries a reason to care about safe passage and makes a political settlement harder to separate from energy supply. For oil-importing businesses, higher fuel and delivery costs could reduce margins or push prices up. The effect on inflation and interest rates would also depend on demand and policy responses.
Higher oil prices do not mean every company wins
For a producer, revenue depends on price and delivered volume. For a shipowner, longer trips may support demand for ships, while fuel, insurance, delays, and lost cargo work the other way. For a broker, I would look at completed fixtures and fee terms. I would not assume that higher oil prices automatically mean higher profit for a shipping company or Clarksons.
Three cases I would put into the model
Recovery: pipeline output and safe deliveries rise, reducing pressure on prices and transport costs. Continued disruption: flows remain uneven, with higher costs and more cash tied up in transit. Further damage: another outage cuts deliveries and raises costs again. These are scenarios, not assigned probabilities or price forecasts. I would vary delivered volume, realized price, extra voyage days, fuel, insurance, and payment timing separately.
A simple check on the numbers
As an illustration only, a 10% rise in price and a 15% fall in delivered volume gives 1.10 × 0.85 = 0.935. Revenue would be 6.5% lower before costs. This is not a forecast for Saudi Arabia or any company. It shows why changing only the oil-price assumption can give the wrong answer.
How I used my September outlook
I used my September oil-price outlook as a starting point, then checked its main argument against public sources. I would change its suggestion that the move is mostly a risk premium: the supply and inventory reports show real shortages as well. I have not repeated unverified spot quotes or combined bank targets that refer to different periods.
Keep the forecast date visible
EIA’s September forecast was completed on 3 September and released on 9 September. It therefore predates the later attacks and pipeline developments discussed here. Its forecast is a dated reference, not a fresh prediction made on 25 September. This note uses public reporting available when checked on 25 September; it is not a live market feed. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
What could challenge this view
The pressure could ease if pipeline flows and safe shipping recover. High prices can also reduce demand. The IEA expects global oil demand to fall by 2.5 million barrels a day in 2026. That is why I would not turn a new attack into a single confident year-end oil-price target. Source: International Energy Agency.
What I will watch next
I would track actual loading volumes at Yanbu, pipeline throughput, safe passage through Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, oil inventories, diesel prices, freight rates, and war-risk insurance. I would date every observation, separate reported claims from confirmed flows, and update the model only when the evidence changes.
Sources
- September STEO — Global oil markets — U.S. Energy Information Administration · Published 2026-09-09; accessed 2026-09-25
- Oil Market Report — September 2026 — International Energy Agency · Published 2026-09-11; accessed 2026-09-25
- Saudi Arabia says it intercepted Houthi missiles; group claims strikes on Riyadh, Aramco — Reuters, via Al-Monitor · Published 2026-09-24; accessed 2026-09-25
- September STEO — Release and forecast dates — U.S. Energy Information Administration · Published 2026-09-09; accessed 2026-09-25